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INTRODUCTION 
Americans describe the new healthcare system established by the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”)1 as both a blessing 
and a nightmare.2 For millions of low- and middle-income Americans, 
the ACA offers access to health insurance they could not otherwise 
                                                                                                             
 *  Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America, 
Washington, D.C.; formerly General Counsel, National Railroad Passenger Company 
(Amtrak); Chief Legal Officer, The University of Pennsylvania Health System; and 
Partner, Williams & Connolly, LLP. The author extends her thanks to Kimberly Ulan for 
her first-rate research assistance and to the editors of the University of Miami Business 
Law Review for their excellent editorial work. 
1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010) (codified as amended primarily in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
2 See, e.g., Barbara Anderson, In Valley, Affordable Care Act Called a Blessing or a 
Nightmare, FRESNO BEE (Dec. 6, 2014), available at http://www.fresnobee.com/2014/12/
06/4273305/valley-residents-have-mixed-emotions.html; Abby Goodnough, In New 
Healthcare Era, Blessings and Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2014, at A1; J.D. Harrison, 
Obamacare: A Blessing for Some Small Businesses, and a Nightmare for Others, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/on-small-business/
obamacare-a-blessing-for-some-small-businesses-and-a-nightmare-for-others/2014/11/
14/6237952e-6aa7-11e4-9fb4-a622dae742a2_story.html. 
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afford.3 The ACA’s opponents, however, view the new healthcare 
system as a threat to economic prosperity, an intrusion on personal 
liberty and a violation of the principles of federalism at the heart of our 
system of government.4 These same kinds of arguments were made more 
than eighty years ago in response to President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt’s New Deal.5 In the 1930s, the United States embraced far-
reaching economic and social reforms including the National Industrial 
Recovery Act,6 the Agricultural Adjustment Act,7 the National Labor 
Relations Act (“NLRA”),8 the Social Security Act,9 and a host of other 
federal initiatives.10 Many Americans welcomed these laws as a response 
to the economic devastation of the Great Depression and the human 
suffering it engendered.11 Others, however, viewed New Deal reforms as 
misguided, or even malevolent, missteps that undermined the free 
enterprise system, sapped individual initiative, and gave the federal 
government far too much control over businesses and individuals.12 
More than half a century later, the debate over the wisdom of the 
New Deal continues, but there is no doubt that the economic and social 
reforms introduced in the 1930s changed the shape of our society. 
Collective bargaining rights affirmed by the NLRA,13 the national 
minimum wage established by the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”),14 
                                                                                                             
3 See infra note 151–155 and accompanying text. 
4 See, e.g., notes 118–121 and accompanying text. 
5 See, e.g., Part I.B. and accompanying text. 
6 National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (codified at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 703–710), invalidated by A.L.A. Schechter Poultry v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 
(1935) (repealed 2002). 
7 Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-430 52 Stat. 31 (1938) 
(codified as amended 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281–1407). 
8 National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169). 
9 Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 301–1397 (2012)). 
10 See e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-17, 48 Stat. 58 
(1933) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 831–831ee (2012)); Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 
73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); 
Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012)). 
11 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL: THE AGE OF 
ROOSEVELT 3 (1988) [hereinafter SCHLESINGER, JR., COMING OF THE NEW DEAL]; see 
William E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, 1932-1940 1–
3 (1963) [hereinafter LEUCHTENBURG, ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL]. 
12 SCHLESINGER, JR., COMING OF THE NEW DEAL, supra note 11, at 471 & 474. 
13 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2012). 
14 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012)); National Labor Relations 
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and the creation of economic safety nets for the elderly and the 
unemployed through the Social Security Act15 are among the New Deal’s 
most enduring legacies. But the New Deal left out one critical card: a 
national healthcare system. It would take nearly eight decades for that 
card to be played.16 
President Barack Obama signed the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”) into law on March 23, 2010.17 The 
new healthcare, like the New Deal economic and social reforms enacted 
during the 1930s, has engendered both ardent support and fierce 
opposition. King v. Burwell,18 argued in the United States Supreme Court 
on March 4, 2015, is the third major challenge to the ACA to come 
before the Court in four years.19 The case involves a dispute over the 
construction of an ACA provision pertaining to the tax credits critical to 
making health insurance accessible to low-income individuals and 
families.20 The stakes are extraordinarily high. One of the think tank 
lawyers who launched the litigation estimates that a victory for the King 
plaintiffs could impact more than fifty-seven million Americans21; others 
contend that a decision adverse to the government could gut the system 
established by the ACA.22 The new healthcare is embodied in a single 
statute rather than a series of new laws, but the crusade against 
“Obamacare” is similar in many ways to the war on the New Deal. 
                                                                                                             
(Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 151–169). 
15 Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (2012)). 
16 Efforts on the part of Presidents Harry Truman, Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton to 
create national healthcare systems all failed to get off the ground. See Elisabeth 
Goodridge and Sarah Arnquist, A History of Overhauling Healthcare: Nearly 100 Years 
of Legislative Milestones and Defeats, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2009/07/19/us/politics/20090717_HEALTH_TIMELINE.htmlt (last visited Apr. 8, 
2015). 
17 President Barack Obama, President Obama Signs Health Reform into Law (Mar. 23, 
2010) (video available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/president-
obama-signs-health-reform-law); Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, A Stroke of a Pen, 
Make That 20, and It’s Official, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2010, at A19. 
18 King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S.Ct. 475 (2014). 
19 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012); Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014). 
20 King, 759 F.3d at 364-65. 
21 Michael F. Cannon, King v. Burwell Would Free More Than 57 Million Americans 
From the ACA’s Individual & Employer Mandates, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/sites/
michaelcannon/2014/07/21/halbig-v-burwell-would-free-more-than-57-million-
americans-from-the-acas-individual-employer-mandates/ (last updated Jan. 22, 2015). 
22 See, e.g., The Phony Legal Attack on Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2015, at 
SR8. 
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This essay considers King v. Burwell in light of the New Deal 
experience. It offers three principal observations. First, despite 
widespread popular support, the social reforms of the 1930s, like the new 
healthcare, encountered extreme, often deeply emotional, resistance 
rooted in fears about jeopardizing the free enterprise system and 
compromising personal freedom.23 Second, in resolving the principal 
legal challenges to New Deal programs, the Supreme Court focused 
primarily on the same issues at the core of the public debate – the 
constitutional limits of federal power and the nature of individual 
liberty.24 Third, King v. Burwell is qualitatively different from both the 
New Deal cases and the challenges to the ACA litigated in N.F.I.B. v. 
Sebelius25 and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.26 No matter how the 
Supreme Court rules in King, its decision will neither address the major 
issues of constitutional structure at the core of the public debate over the 
ACA, nor elucidate principles of individual liberty critical to the 
establishment of a national healthcare system.27 
While the Supreme Court could well conclude that the King 
plaintiffs have a viable argument, it would be a shame to see the most 
sweeping social reform since the New Deal eviscerated by a technical 
ruling based on the niceties of statutory construction or administrative 
deference. For all of the criticism levied against the Supreme Court with 
respect to decisions overturning New Deal initiatives, the Court never 
chose to invalidate—or later uphold—New Deal legislation in this 
fashion. The ACA is one of the most important social initiatives ever 
enacted in the United States, and the tax-credit subsidies at issue in King 
already have allowed more than seven million Americans to purchase 
health insurance they otherwise could not afford.28 This essay argues that 
the fate of the ACA—like that of the New Deal social reforms that 
preceded it—should hinge on equally weighty legal principles. 
                                                                                                             
23 See infra Part I. 
24 See infra Part II. 
25 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. 2566. 
26 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751; see infra Part III. 
27 Ironically, the only potential constitutional issue pertaining to King v. Burwell could 
be created by a ruling adverse to the government. See infra Part IV. 
28 While some estimate that 7.5 million Americans would lose ACA subsidies if the 
Court rules against the government, others estimate more than nine million Americans 
would lose subsidies. Compare The Health Care Supreme Court Case: Who Would Be 
Affected?, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/03/us/potential-
impact-of-the-supreme-courts-decision-on-health-care-subsidies.html?_r=0 (last updated 
Mar. 12, 2015) with Brief of the Commonwealths of Virginia et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Affirmance at 8, King v. Burwell, No. 14-114, 2015 WL 412333 (Jan. 28, 
2015) [hereinafter Brief of the Commonwealths]. 
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I. THE NEW DEAL AND ITS IMPACT 
The New Deal encompassed innovative programs designed to 
address the economic crisis of the Great Depression and its devastating 
impacts on millions of Americans. The following sections offer a brief 
overview of New Deal initiatives and some of their key supporters and 
opponents. 
A. New Deal Foundations of Social Reform 
The New Deal began with an intensive period of legislative activity 
during President Franklin Roosevelt’s first one hundred days in office.29 
At that time, millions of Americans were out of work; home and farm 
foreclosures were rampant; businesses were closing their doors; and 
many people teetered on the brink of starvation.30 After FDR’s 
inauguration on March 4, 1933, the Roosevelt administration 
immediately began proposing legislation in an effort to turn the tide of 
the Great Depression.31 Early New Deal initiatives included the Banking 
Act,32 the Securities Act,33 the National Industrial Recovery Act,34 and 
new programs, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, designed to build 
infrastructure and create jobs.35 
Toward the end of FDR’s first term in office, the administration 
introduced another round of social and economic reforms often referred 
to as the “Second New Deal.”36 The legislative initiatives of the Second 
New Deal included both the National Labor Relations Act37 and the 
                                                                                                             
29 See SCHLESINGER, JR., COMING OF THE NEW DEAL, supra note 11, at 20–21; 
LEUCHTENBURG, ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, supra note 11, at 41–62. 
30 ANTHONY J. BADGER, FDR: THE FIRST HUNDRED DAYS 3–4 (2008); LEUCHTENBURG, 
ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, supra note 11, at 1–3, 18. 
31 National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (codified at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 703–710), invalidated by A.L.A. Schechter Poultry v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 
(1935) (repealed 2002). 
32 Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
33 Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012)). 
34 National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (codified at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 703–710), invalidated by A.L.A. Schechter Poultry v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 
(1935) (repealed 2002). 
35 Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-17, 48 Stat. 58 (1933) 
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 831–831ee (2012)). 
36 Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The ‘Hundred Days’ of F.D.R., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 
1983, at F1. 
37 National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169). 
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Social Security Act.38 The NLRA provided protections for workers 
seeking to organize and engage in collective bargaining,39 while the 
Social Security Act, perhaps the most important legacy of the New 
Deal, established the Social Security Administration and, over a 
five-year period, put in place a national system of pensions for the 
elderly, unemployment compensation, and benefits for dependent 
children who had lost a parent.40 
In its early days, the New Deal was wildly popular,41 but not 
everyone shared in the widespread public enthusiasm. In 1935, the first 
legal challenges to New Deal legislation reached the Supreme Court, and 
in 1935 and 1936, the Supreme Court struck down more federal laws 
than at any other time in history.42 After a landslide win in the 1936 
presidential election, FDR decided to take on the Supreme Court. He 
introduced a proposal to reorganize the federal courts—the famous 
“Court-packing plan”—that would have increased the number of 
Supreme Court justices to fifteen on the basis of a formula based on the 
ages of the current justices.43 Unfortunately for the President, 
Congress—and the public—decisively rejected the Court-packing plan.44 
During 1937, FDR briefly embraced fiscal conservatism, urging 
Congress to cut back on federal spending and balance the budget,45 but 
this idea, too, proved unsuccessful. By the fall of 1937, the country was 
in the grip of a “new depression”; by early 1938, starvation once again 
threatened millions of Americans.46 The President decided to return to a 
policy of deficit spending and embark on major new initiatives to address 
                                                                                                             
38 Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 301–1397 (2012)). 
39 National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449. 
40 Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620. 
41 William E. Leuchtenburg, Showdown on the Court, SMITHSONIAN, May 2005, at 106 
[hereinafter Leuchtenburg, Showdown] (describing parades and other public 
demonstrations of support for early New Deal programs). 
42 Id. at 108; see, e.g., Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), and A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down provisions 
of the National Industrial Recovery Act); United State v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) 
(holding the Agricultural Adjustment Act unconstitutional); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 
298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating minimum-wage and maximum-hours provisions of the 
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act). 
43 LEUCHTENBURG, ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, supra note 11, at 232–33; GEORGE 
MCJIMSEY, THE PRESIDENCY OF FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT 172–73 (2000). 
44 MCJIMSEY, supra note 43, at 173–74; LEUCHTENBURG, ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW 
DEAL, supra note 11, at 233–39; REXFORD G. TUGWELL, FDR: ARCHITECT OF AN ERA 
166–67 (1967). 
45 See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 211–14 (1960) 
[hereinafter SCHLESINGER, JR., POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL]; MCJIMSEY, supra note 43, at 178. 
46 MCJIMSEY, supra note 43, 174–78; see LEUCHTENBURG, ROOSEVELT AND THE 
NEW DEAL, supra note 11, at 244–45. 
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the escalating economic problems. This time, the going was more 
difficult. 
The Fair Labor Standards Act47—designed to establish a national 
minimum wage and to require “fair practices” in the workplace—was 
one of the key reforms the Roosevelt Administration introduced in 1938. 
However, the proposed legislation encountered significant resistance in 
Congress, and it took more than a year to make its way through the 
House and Senate.48 The FLSA proved to be the last of the major New 
Deal reforms.49 By 1939, the economy had grown stronger, opposition 
had solidified in Congress, and the specter of war overshadowed the 
focus on economic and social reform.50 But the New Deal changed the 
nation. As a result of New Deal initiatives, the United States has a 
national minimum wage, workplace protections, and social safety nets 
for the elderly and those who lose their jobs. 
Looking back on the New Deal, it is striking that its social 
reforms did not include healthcare. The Roosevelt Administration 
made a number of efforts to secure the support of the American Medical 
Association and other key constituencies for a national healthcare 
system, but they were unsuccessful.51 Even the advent of World War II 
failed to galvanize support for a national healthcare system. In 1943, 
Senator Robert Wagner (sponsor of the NLRA or “Wagner Act”), along 
with Senator James Murray, proposed a payroll-based national healthcare 
system as part of the Wagner-Murray bill in the Senate, and 
Representative John Dingell proposed a similar plan in the House.52 Both 
bills died in committee.53 In his 1944 State of the Union address, FDR 
                                                                                                             
47 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012)). 
48 Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a 
Minimum Wage, 101 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 22, 22 (1978); LEUCHTENBURG, ROOSEVELT 
AND THE NEW DEAL, supra note 11, at 262–63, 347. 
49 See LEUCHTENBURG, ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, supra note 11, at 347; see 
generally Grossman, supra note 48 (discussing New Deal legislation and detailing the 
drafting and politics of the FLSA). 
50 LEUCHTENBURG, ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, supra note 11, at 346–48. 
51 The American Medical Association opposed a national health insurance program, 
even calling an emergency session of the AMA House of Delegates in February 1935, 
when it appeared possible that the president might include healthcare in the Social 
Security Act legislation he was about to propose. See Social Security History, SOCIAL 
SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/history/1930.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2015); The 
Evolution of Medicare, SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/history/corningchap3.
html (last visited Apr. 9, 2015); SCHLESINGER, JR., COMING OF THE NEW DEAL, supra note 
11, at 307. 
52 Wagner-Murray Bill, S. 1050, 79th Cong. (1945); Dingell Bill, H.R. 3293, 79th 
Cong. (1945). 
53 The Evolution of Medicare, supra note 51. 
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included a “right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve 
and enjoy good health” in his call for a “Second Bill of Rights,”54 but he 
died without accomplishing his goal.55 Harry Truman, FDR’s successor, 
identified universal healthcare insurance as an element of the “Fair 
Deal” he sought for all Americans,56 but he, too, found a national 
healthcare system out of reach.   
The New Deal did not create a national healthcare system, but the 
social reforms introduced during the 1930s altered the relationship 
between the federal government and the private sector and provided a 
foundation for subsequent healthcare initiatives. Thirty years later, in 
July 1965, amendments to the Social Security Act established the 
Medicare and Medicaid programs signed into law by President Lyndon 
Baines Johnson.57 Although the ACA emerged independently of the 
Social Security Act and other New Deal programs, these social reforms 
also paved the way for enactment of the United States’ first national 
healthcare initiative. When FDR signed the Social Security Act on 
August 14, 1935, he stated: 
We can never insure one hundred percent of the 
population against one hundred percent of the hazards 
and vicissitudes of life, but we have tried to frame a law 
which will give some measure of protection to the 
average citizen and to his family against the loss of a job 
and against poverty-ridden old age.58 
President Barack Obama echoed similar themes seventy-five years later 
when, on March 23, 2010, he signed the ACA: “[W]e have now just 
                                                                                                             
54 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Address (Jan. 11, 1944) 
(transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16518); see also CASS 
R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY 
WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 10 (2006). 
55 FDR died of a cerebral hemorrhage at White Springs, Georgia on April 12, 1945. 
The Presidents: Franklin D. Roosevelt, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/
presidents/franklindroosevelt (last visited Apr. 9, 2015). 
56 President Truman later wrote that “the failure to defeat organized opposition to a 
national compulsory health insurance program” was the most troubling disappointment of 
his presidency. Wendy R. Liebowitz, Harry and Health Care, TRUMAN SCHOLARS ASS’N 
(Apr. 13, 2010), http://trumanscholars.org/for-scholars/harry-and-health-care/ (citing 
MONTE M. POEN, STRICTLY PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL: THE LETTERS HARRY TRUMAN 
NEVER MAILED (1982)). 
57 Medicare Is Signed Into Law, SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/history/
lbjsm.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2015). President Johnson signed the Medicare and 
Medicaid legislation in Independence, Missouri with former President Truman sitting 
beside him. Id. 
58 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Statement on Signing the Social Security Act 
(Aug. 14, 1935) (transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14916). 
2015] FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW HEALTHCARE 325 
 
enshrined . . . the core principle that everybody should have some basic 
security when it comes to their health care.”59  
B. Friends and Foes of New Deal Reforms 
FDR connected directly with voters more effectively than any 
president in history. His overwhelming victory in the 1936 presidential 
election—with more than sixty percent of the popular vote, a margin of 
523 to 8 in the electoral college, and victories in 46 of the 48 states60—
reflected the degree of public support for the New Deal. The New Deal 
concept of collective responsibility for the plight of the poor and the 
vulnerable also resonated with many people of faith,61 including Roman 
Catholics, Jews and liberal Protestants.62 While more conservative 
Protestants were less inclined to support the New Deal, the Federal 
Council of Churches enthusiastically endorsed its social reforms.63 To 
many liberal Protestants, the New Deal was the incarnation of the Social 
Gospel.64 To Roman Catholics, perhaps FDR’s most important religious 
constituency,65 the New Deal embodied Catholic social teaching.66 
People throughout the United States responded to FDR’s inaugural 
declaration that “the only thing we have to fear is fear itself,”67 but the 
New Deal itself created fears for some Americans. Some argued that the 
Roosevelt Administration’s initiatives did not go far enough in 
addressing the plight of those whose lives were devastated by the Great 
                                                                                                             
59 Remarks by the President and Vice President, President Obama Signs Health 
Reform into Law (Mar. 23, 2010) (video available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-
and-video/video/president-obama-signs-health-reform-law). 
60 1936 Presidential Election Results, http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/national.
php?year=1936 (last visited Apr. 9, 2015). 
61 KEVIN M. KRUSE, ONE NATION UNDER GOD 5 (2015) (“When Roosevelt launched 
the New Deal, an array of politically liberal clergymen championed his proposal for a 
vast welfare state as simply ‘the Christian thing to do.’”); Harold Meyerson, God and the 
New Deal, AM. PROSPECT (Nov. 21, 2004), http://prospect.org/article/god-and-new-deal 
(“There was, in fact, a clear religious component to the New Deal.”); see GEORGE Q. 
FLYNN, AMERICAN CATHOLICS & THE ROOSEVELT PRESIDENCY 36 (1968). 
62 DAVID EDWIN HARRELL, JR. ET AL., UNTO A GOOD LAND: A HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN PEOPLE 934 (2005); A. JAMES REICHLEY, FAITH IN POLITICS 222 (2002); Jill 
Quadagno & Dean Roblinger, The Religious Factor in U.S. State Welfare Politics in 
RELIGION, CLASS COALITIONS, AND WELFARE STATES 241 (KEES VAN KERSBERGEN & 
PHILIP MANOW eds. 2009). 
63 Quadagno & Roblinger, supra note 63, at 241. 
64 Id.; HARRELL ET AL., supra note 62, at 934. 
65 Meyerson, supra note 61; FLYNN, supra note 61, at 36–37. 
66 FLYNN, supra note 61, at 36–37. 
67 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933) (transcript 
available at http://www. presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14473). 
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Depression.68 The most vocal criticism, however, came from the business 
sector as it became increasingly clear that the New Deal was radically 
changing the relationship between the federal government and the private 
sector. Business leaders and those who believed in unfettered free 
enterprise voiced the same kinds of criticisms against New Deal Social 
Reforms later raised against the ACA and the new healthcare. 
Many business leaders reacted positively to the New Deal when FDR 
became president in 1933. Desperate economic conditions, the level of 
uncertainty within the business community itself, and FDR’s desire to 
work with business leaders created a unique opportunity for an alliance 
between government and business.69 This confluence of interests quickly 
led to the enactment of the National Industrial Recovery Act (“NIRA”) 
and the creation of the National Recovery Administration (“NRA”).70 
The NRA instituted cooperative efforts, including suspension of federal 
antitrust laws, designed to moderate cutthroat competition and promote 
fair practices on the basis of voluntary codes pertaining to wages, hours, 
and pricing.71. Participating businesses displayed NRA blue eagle labels; 
politicians praised the eagle; and parades celebrated the famous 
symbol.72 Even the Schechter brothers, whose indictment on charges of 
violating NIRA codes led to the famous Supreme Court case,73 supported 
the NRA in its early days.74 
As the economy improved and the administration began to enforce 
the new laws, criticism from the business sector grew more pointed and 
more public. While some business leaders continued to support the New 
Deal,75 as one historian notes, “New Deal national intervention exceeded 
all previous parameters for national action, [and] only the most prescient 
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SCHLESINGER, JR., COMING OF THE NEW DEAL, supra note 11, at 114–15; see infra Part II. 
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75 LEUCHTENBURG, ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, supra note 11, at 189–90; 
SCHLESINGER, JR., COMING OF THE NEW DEAL, supra note 11, at 494. 
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and politically astute businessmen were not frightened into some form of 
opposition.”76 Wall Street, in particular, grew increasingly antagonistic 
as investigations of the financial community quickly led to enactment of 
the Securities Act of 193377 and, a year later, to the Securities Exchange 
Act in 1934.78 Business leaders contended that government intervention 
was interfering with, not encouraging, economic recovery.79 At the same 
time, union organizing campaigns and a number of contentious strikes 
led to growing concerns about the nature of New Deal reforms.80 
Prominent business leaders began to use terms such as communist and 
even fascist to characterize the Roosevelt administration and the New 
Deal.81 In the view of many businessmen, the New Deal was becoming a 
means of creating “an all-powerful central government . . . undertak[ing] 
to control and direct the lives and destinies of all.”82 
Little more than a year after its inception, criticism of the New Deal 
from the private sector increasingly began to take on a deeply emotional 
tenor. President Herbert Hoover described the New Deal as a 
“stupendous invasion of the whole spirit of liberty,”83 and many 
businessmen agreed that the New Deal was threatening the American 
way of life, undermining individual responsibility, and obliterating the 
role of the states.84 As historian Arthur Schlesinger points out, 
businessmen came to believe that they “were fighting for civilization 
itself.”85 In response to these beliefs, in 1934, a handful of prominent 
industrialists banded together with conservative Democrats who 
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disapproved of FDR’s agenda to form the American Liberty League to 
oppose the New Deal.86 League spokesmen later assailed the New Deal 
as an invasion of all that Americans held sacred, characterizing New 
Deal policies as “a trend toward Fascist control of agriculture”87 and the 
Social Security Act as “the end of democracy.”88 
Opposition from the business sector increased in response to the 
Second New Deal initiatives. Senator Robert Wagner’s introduction of 
the legislation that would become the NLRA created a sense of outrage 
as business leaders and associations, such as the National Association of 
Manufacturers and the U. S. Chamber of Commerce (a supporter of early 
New Deal measures89), vigorously opposed federal statutory protections 
for labor.90 Like the NLRA, the Social Security Act encountered 
significant ongoing resistance.91 FDR signed the Social Security Act on 
August 14, 1935.92 One year later, during the final months of the 1936 
presidential election campaign, the implementation of the first Social 
Security payroll taxes scheduled for January 1, 1937, loomed large.93 
Business groups created anti-Social Security posters intended to dissuade 
workers from voting to reelect FDR with statements such as: “You’re 
sentenced to a weekly pay reduction for all your working life. You’ll 
have to serve the sentence unless you help reverse it November 3.”94 
Many businesses included similar messages in workers’ pay envelopes.95 
In October, steel magnate Ernest Weir, wrote a piece for Fortune 
magazine declaring that the President was opposed “almost unanimously 
by the business and professional men of the country.”96 These efforts did 
not prevent FDR’s overwhelming victory, but they reveal that many 
business people perceived the New Deal as antithetical to their interests, 
contrary to our constitutional system, and an assault on the American 
way of life. 
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As the 1930s drew to a close, the sense of crisis had abated, 
opposition was mounting, and Congress began to dismantle a number of 
New Deal programs.97 It is impossible to say what might have happened 
if the country had continued on a peacetime basis, because momentous 
events intervened. On December 7, 1941, Japanese forces bombed Pearl 
Harbor, and the United States immediately declared war on Japan.98 
Within a few months, the nation was at war in Europe as well.99 FDR 
died before the war ended, and, despite repeated efforts to revive it, the 
idea of a national healthcare system remained moribund for decades. But 
Social Security and other New Deal reforms became part of the fabric of 
our society, and the changes in the economic and social role of the 
federal government wrought by the New Deal created a foundation for 
later social reforms, including the new healthcare. 
II. THE NEW DEAL IN THE SUPREME COURT 
The first lawsuits challenging New Deal laws came before the 
Supreme Court in 1935 during the mid-1930s.100 Two cases decided in 
May 1935—A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States101 and 
United States v. Butler102—toppled pillars of the New Deal. Schechter 
Poultry held the NIRA unconstitutional,103 while Butler struck down the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.104 That same year, in Railroad 
Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co.,105 the Court struck down the 
compulsory retirement and pension system established by the Railroad 
Retirement Act of 1934.106 In May 1936, in Carter v. Carter Coal 
Company,107 the Court invalidated the Bituminous Coal Conservation 
Act of 1935 and the maximum-hour and minimum-wage regulations it 
established for coal miners.108 
In 1937, however, in the first constitutional challenge to New Deal 
legislation after Justice Owen Roberts joined the majority in holding a 
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state minimum-wage law constitutional in West Coast Hotel v. 
Parrish,109 the Supreme Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act 
in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.110 Shortly thereafter, the Court 
upheld the Social Security Act in Helvering v. Davis111 and the Social 
Security payroll tax in Steward Machine Company v. Davis.112 In 1941, 
the Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act in United States v. 
Darby.113  
Scholars disagree as to whether the latter cases upholding New Deal 
laws constituted a radical break from prior decisions striking down early 
New Deal programs,114 but one point is clear: All of the cases involved 
major constitutional principles, and the Court’s rulings turned on 
analyses of constitutional questions that included the scope of the 
Commerce Power and the Taxing and Spending Power, the reach of the 
Fifth and Tenth Amendments, and separation-of-powers principles. The 
magnitude of the legal issues at stake in these cases was on par with the 
stakes of the litigation. The litigants—individuals and companies 
prosecuted for violating New Deal laws and employers seeking relief 
from new taxes and federal regulations governing the terms on which 
they operated—had very real stakes in the cases they brought. It is hard 
to overstate the importance of these landmark rulings—both those that 
invalidated New Deal laws and those that upheld them. Although the pre-
1937 Court repeatedly ruled against New Deal initiatives and the post-
1937 Court consistently upheld New Deal laws, the cases all undertook 
to answer constitutional questions of far-reaching significance. While the 
underlying legal reasoning was grounded in antithetical perspectives on 
the limits of the power of the federal government, they addressed critical 
questions of constitutional law in keeping with the magnitude of the 
stakes of the litigation. 
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III. KING V. BURWELL IN CONTEXT 
The debate over the ACA strikes a number of chords similar to those 
raised in response to New Deal initiatives. The following paragraphs 
highlight a few key points of comparison. 
A. Reactions to the ACA: Echoes of the New Deal 
President Obama began pursuing the goal of universal healthcare 
coverage shortly after he took office in 2009. From the very beginning, 
the initiative sparked vigorous debate in Congress and throughout the 
nation. After close votes in both the House and Senate, the ACA became 
law on March 23, 2010,115 but intense opposition to healthcare reform 
continued. The first lawsuits were filed the day the President signed the 
ACA116 amid continuing criticism of the new healthcare law. Like the 
opponents of the New Deal, the new healthcare’s adversaries have 
expressed concern that the ACA could raise costs and cut jobs, as well as 
a sense of moral outrage over the new healthcare law as “an 
[u]nconstitutional [v]iolation of [p]ersonal [l]iberty [that] [s]trikes at the 
[h]eart of American Federalism,”117 threatens personal privacy,118 and 
undermines marriage and civil society.119 Although there are significant 
differences in context, these reactions arose out of political and 
philosophical viewpoints similar to those that characterized opposition to 
the New Deal. 
Like the New Deal, the ACA inspired vehement antagonism in the 
business sector, including negative reactions from the National 
Association of Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
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organizations that actively opposed New Deal initiatives in the 1930s.120 
Many businesses and business associations contended that the ACA 
would raise costs and destroy jobs,121 and it was a business association 
that became the named plaintiff in National Federation of Independent 
Businesses v. Sebelius,122 the first ACA case decided by the Supreme 
Court. 
In the N.F.I.B. case, the association, a number of individual 
plaintiffs, and twenty-six states raised a Commerce Clause challenge to 
the ACA’s Individual Mandate requiring Americans either to purchase 
healthcare insurance or make a shared responsibility payment.123 The 
states also contested the Medicaid Expansion provisions withdrawing all 
Medicaid funds from non-participating states as an unconstitutionally 
coercive use of the Spending Power in violation of the Tenth 
Amendment and principles of federalism.124 The Court ultimately ruled 
five to four against the government on the Commerce Clause issue,125 but 
it upheld the Individual Mandate as a proper exercise of the Taxing 
Power.126 By a seven to two margin, the Court held the Medicaid 
expansion provision unduly coercive but allowed the program to stand 
with an opt-out that permitted non-participating states to retain existing 
federal Medicaid funds.127 
As the deadline for implementation of expanded employer insurance 
coverage provisions approached, some businesses responded to the ACA 
by cutting full-time staff to avoid the requirements.128 Others apparently 
concluded that implementation of the ACA has been less costly than they 
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feared, and some organizations that originally sought repeal of the ACA 
began to urge Congress to fix the statute rather than repeal it.129 A 
number of companies in the healthcare field discovered that the ACA 
offers a host of new business opportunities.130 
Overall, resistance to the new healthcare appears to be diminishing in 
the business sector. Big business has been remarkably quiet of late with 
respect to the ACA.131 It is particularly striking that the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, a frequent amicus curiae in the Supreme Court when 
business interests are at stake, did not file an amicus curiae brief in King 
v. Burwell. Other organizations did, however. HCA, Inc. (the nation’s 
largest healthcare corporation), a small business association, and a health 
insurance association filed briefs in support of the government.132 
The response of the religious community also echoes earlier 
reactions to New Deal programs, but unique aspects of the ACA have 
injected new issues into the mix. Like the old-age pensions and 
unemployment compensation system established by the Social Security 
Act, access to the medical care necessary to ensure a healthy life fits with 
the teachings of many religious traditions.133 However, Department of 
Health and Human Services (“HHS”) regulations promulgated pursuant 
to the ACA that require employer coverage of all FDA-approved 
contraceptives, including four drugs deemed to be abortifacients,134 
created issues that never arose with respect to New Deal reforms. 
The use of contraceptives contradicts the teachings of the Roman 
Catholic Church and, to varying degrees, the tenets of other religious 
traditions.135 Consequently, the ACA’s contraceptive coverage 
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requirement sparked a great deal of concern over potential conflicts 
between faith and legal obligations. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc.,136 the Supreme Court ruled five to four in favor of the petitioners in 
a challenge to the HHS contraceptive coverage regulations brought by 
Evangelical Christian and Mennonite business owners pursuant to the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act.137 While the case turned on whether 
the companies were entitled to invoke the Act’s protection, the 
underlying questions whether for-profit business corporations are 
capable of asserting a right to the free exercise of religion and whether 
the HHS regulations substantially burdened that right have significant 
constitutional overtones. 
The controversy over contraceptive coverage has abated to some 
extent following Hobby Lobby, but the decision did not resolve all 
potential religious liberty issues with respect to the ACA.138 The wounds 
created by the contraceptive controversy run deep; concern about the 
ACA and reproductive issues is one of the principal reasons a number of 
people of faith have turned against the ACA in its entirety.139 Others, 
however, while continuing to oppose any form of contraceptive 
coverage, support the ACA insofar as it provides access to medical care 
to those who could not otherwise afford healthcare insurance. Many 
religious groups have been instrumental in encouraging individuals and 
families to obtain insurance through the exchanges and assisting them to 
do so.140 The Catholic Health Association of the United States, a 
Catholic healthcare delivery system, and the Jewish Alliance for Social 
Action all filed briefs in support of the government in King v. Burwell.141 
The Catholic Health Association expressed its mission-based view of the 
dispute as follows: “[A] just society requires taking care of vulnerable 
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and marginalized populations, such as those who lack health care 
coverage.”142 
B. King and the Crusade Against Obamacare 
 Like the New Deal lawsuits and N.F.I.B. v. Sebelius,143 King v. 
Burwell has the potential to eviscerate a sweeping social reform. Unlike 
those cases, however, King does not involve significant constitutional 
questions or even statutory issues with the kinds of constitutional 
ramifications at stake in Hobby Lobby. In this respect, the principal 
decisions of the Supreme Court on New Deal programs and the current 
Court’s rulings in N.F.I.B. and Hobby Lobby had a great deal in 
common, because they addressed questions central to our constitutional 
system. King v. Burwell threatens to dismember the ACA on far more 
prosaic grounds. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari following the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision in favor of the government144 not to decide important questions 
of constitutional law but to determine “whether the Internal Revenue 
Service (“IRS”) may permissibly promulgate regulations to extend tax-
credit subsidies to coverage purchased through Exchanges established by 
the federal government under section 1321 of the ACA.”145 It is 
surprising that the Supreme Court chose to review the case at all. A split 
among the federal circuit courts had yet to materialize—although a 
divided panel of the D.C. Circuit ruled against the government in a 
similar case, the circuit court had vacated that ruling in preparation for 
rehearing en banc146—and there are significant questions as to the 
plaintiffs’ standing.147 The stakes in the litigation are vastly 
disproportionate. At most, the plaintiffs could be required to pay 
relatively small amounts for heavily subsidized healthcare insurance or 
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the statutory shared responsibility payment.148 Conversely, more than 
seven million Americans could lose their healthcare insurance—and 
possibly their economic security—on the basis of a Supreme Court 
decision in favor of the plaintiffs.149 
The King plaintiffs describe themselves as low-income residents of 
Virginia.150 Virginia is one of thirty-four states that have elected a 
federally operated healthcare insurance exchange in lieu of setting up 
their own state-run exchanges.151 Pursuant to the ACA, the Internal 
Revenue Service determined that each of the King plaintiffs was entitled 
to receive a tax credit to subsidize the purchase of health insurance 
through the Virginia exchange. Plaintiffs, however, contend that they are 
not entitled to the subsidies, and they do not want them.152 They argue 
that without the subsidies they would be entitled to exemptions from the 
Act’s Individual Mandate requiring individuals either to purchase health 
insurance or make a shared responsibility payment.153 The ACA defines 
eligibility for subsidies in terms of “coverage months” determined by 
those months for which “the taxpayer . . . is covered by a qualified health 
plan . . . enrolled in through an Exchange established by the State under 
section 1311 of [the ACA].”154 The plaintiffs claim that the IRS has no 
authority to extend the subsidies to individuals who reside in states in 
which the federal government operates the state’s healthcare insurance 
exchange.155 The government contends that the King plaintiffs’ argument 
is based “on an acontextual misreading of a single phrase”156 that would 
produce “[a]bsurd [r]esults” contrary to the ACA’s structure and 
design,157 and that, even if there is some ambiguity, the Treasury 
Department’s interpretation is authoritative and entitled to judicial 
deference.158 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit suggested 
that the government had the better argument with respect to statutory 
construction, but concluded that the statutory language was not clear 
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enough to resolve the issue.159 Invoking Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,160 the circuit court held that the IRS 
rule was a permissible reading of the statute.161 The King plaintiffs 
contend that the Fourth Circuit erred in ignoring the plain language of the 
provision, and they deny that Chevron deference is even relevant in light 
of that language.162 The government argues that the Fourth Circuit 
correctly determined “that the Affordable Care Act authorizes Treasury 
to make premium tax credits available on an equal basis to Americans in 
every State, as one would expect in a statute designed to provide 
‘Affordable Coverage Choices for All Americans.’”163 
The legal issues are neither complex nor of great significance in and 
of themselves, but a decision in favor of the plaintiffs would wreak 
havoc with the statutory scheme. Unlike cases such as Schechter, Butler, 
Carter Coal, Jones & Laughlin Steel, Helvering and Steward Machine, 
King does not pose issues that go to the heart of our constitutional 
system. The case had its genesis in a conservative think tank decision to 
pick up and run with an employment lawyer’s observation that the 
challenged phrase made the ACA vulnerable to an argument that 
subsidies are not available in states that have opted to have exchanges 
run by the federal government.164 While its origins do not undermine the 
legitimacy of the lawsuit, they do buttress the conclusion that the lawsuit 
is not so much an effort to resolve legal issues of major importance with 
respect to the ACA as an attempt to eviscerate the new healthcare in any 
possible way, whatever the cost. 165 
Although unlikely, it is possible that the Supreme Court could decide 
that the King plaintiffs’ action is barred on standing grounds—an 
argument rejected by the Fourth Circuit166 but raised by Justice Ginsburg 
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during oral argument.167 Assuming, as is likely, that the Court reaches 
the merits, the decision almost certainly will turn on the justices’ views 
of either statutory construction principles or the deference due 
administrative interpretations of statutes imposing rule-making 
requirements. Ironically, the only constitutional wrinkles with respect to 
the merits of the case would result from a ruling adverse to the 
government, a point raised by Justice Kennedy during oral argument.168 
As twenty-three states argued in an amicus brief, an adverse decision 
could force states with federally operated exchanges to choose between 
creating their own exchanges and losing healthcare insurance subsidies 
for their residents in a manner that could well be unduly coercive in 
violation of the Tenth Amendment and principles of federalism.169 The 
states further contend that taking away subsidies without prior notice is 
contrary to Supreme Court precedents holding that conditions on federal 
grants to states must be clearly stated.170 The Court can avoid these 
constitutional questions only by ruling in favor of the government. 
More than seven million Americans already have utilized ACA tax-
credit subsidies to purchase health insurance on state exchanges.171 An 
adverse decision in King could cost these low- and middle-income 
individuals and families their health care insurance and fatally undermine 
the system set up by the ACA.172 Given the current political climate, the 
Court is in the unenviable position of finding itself equipped to 
eviscerate the ACA knowing that Congress probably will not be able to 
repair such serious wounds before they become fatal.173 
Most significantly from the perspective of this essay, a Supreme 
Court decision against the government in King would be a significant 
departure from the principal New Deal decisions, as well as N.F.I.B. and 
Hobby Lobby. As noted earlier, those decisions addressed critical 
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constitutional questions pertaining to the nature of our constitutional 
system and the individual liberties it is intended to protect—the same 
questions that infused the debate over both the New Deal and the new 
healthcare. While all of these decisions had their critics, whether it 
upheld or stuck down the contested social reform legislation, the 
Supreme Court addressed major constitutional questions that only the 
judiciary could resolve. That is not the case in King. 
There is an alternative. If the Court rules in favor of the government, 
Congress will still have the ability to repeal or amend the ACA through 
the normal political processes. In recent years, the Court has lauded the 
virtues of political accountability in cases such as New York v. United 
States174 and Printz v. United States.175 The best way to ensure political 
accountability with respect to the ACA is to permit the political process 
to take its course in Congress. 
CONCLUSION 
The members of the Supreme Court have a critical choice to make in 
King v. Burwell. If they elect to rule against the government, the ACA 
will be gravely, perhaps fatally, impaired. The future of the most 
significant social reform of the last several decades should not depend on 
analyses that will neither engage the critical questions of federalism and 
individual liberty at the heart of the healthcare debate nor shed light on 
the constitutional limits of federal power. 
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